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Introduction 
The asymmetry of power between ‘creditor’ and ‘debtor’ countries in the manage-
ment of the euro area (EA) crisis and the on-going institutional reform process of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have brought the issue of German dominance 
in Europe back to the forefront of scholarly debates. Many agree that Germany – sup-
ported by the other creditor countries – was able to set the terms of several key re-
forms of the EMU regime in ways that correspond to its creditor interests (Blyth and 
Matthijs 2011; Bulmer and Patterson 2013; Thompson 2013; Webber 2013). These 
scholars rightly note that in an intergovernmentalist setting Germany’s creditor 
strength was a key source of its ‘institutional power’ to reform the EMU regime in 
accordance with these interests. German engagement and support is seen to be indis-
pensable to the durability of the euro in ways that allowed the German government to 
manage the crisis according to its priorities ‘as a price for continuing financial support 
for EA debtor states’ (Webber 2011: 20). At the same time, these scholars consider 
the power of ‘hyper-competitive’ Germany as central to the problem of intra-regional 
macroeconomic imbalances, making it impossible to solve the EA crisis in the longer 
term without a more symmetrical distribution of adjustment costs between creditor 
and debtor countries. Since the German government aimed ‘to restrict the creation and 
autonomy of supranational organs in favour of more intergovernmental decision-
making to preserve a veto over key future decisions’ in order ‘to maximize the likeli-
hood that the Euro crisis is managed in a way compatible with Germany’s prefer-
ences’ (Webber 2011: 20), these authors note that the survival of the euro cannot be 
taken for granted. Indeed, as Thompson (2013: 15) maintains, ‘German institutional 
power is entrenched as the condition on which German membership of the [EA] con-
tinues.’     
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In this article we draw on the insights of Historical Institutionalism (HI) to demon-
strate that the German government is more constrained than these intergovernmental-
ist analyses of its dominance imply. First, we argue that the increased sunk costs of 
European monetary integration have reduced the attractiveness of the exit option and 
pushed the German government to adjust the EMU regime in order to make it more 
sustainable. These sunk costs are defined in terms of the increased returns of the EMU 
for various domestic groups in Germany, which became increasingly linked to the rest 
of the EA both in trade and financial terms as a result of the adoption of the euro. Se-
cond, we draw attention to the domestic institutional sources of its creditor prefer-
ences, which reflect four clusters of domestic societal interests deeply rooted in the 
institutional structure of its coordinated market economy: trade interests of the export-
oriented sectors, fiscal interests of its taxpayers, monetary interests of the Bundesbank 
and financial interests of the banking industry. Third, we maintain that the German 
government’s pursuit of these interests during the key institutional reforms produced 
unintended negative feedback loops – (1) the escalation of sovereign bond spreads 
and the fragmentation of the European financial system from 2011 to 2012 and (2) the 
intensification of deflationary pressures between 2013 a d 2015 – that could only be 
mitigated through the implementation of increasingly unconventional monetary poli-
cies by the ECB. We analyse the reactive sequences through which these two negative 
spillovers were mitigated, thereby exposing the difficulties the German government 
encountered in accommodating the domestic societal interests underlying its creditor 
preferences.  
Germany and the irreversibility of the euro: a historical institutionalist perspec-
tive 
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A central claim of HI is that member states ‘may be in a strong initial position, seek to 
maximize their interests, and nevertheless carry out institutional reforms that funda-
mentally transform their own positions ... in ways that are unanticipated and/or unde-
sired’ (Pierson 1996: 126). As such, HI maintains that ‘gaps’ in member state control 
over European integration will appear far more prominent than they do in intergov-
ernmentalist accounts, where creditor governments set the terms of reforms and de-
termine the space for supranational agency.  The ‘sunk costs’ of European integration 
are a key source of such gaps in member state control over European-level policy 
processes: ‘While sovereign member states engaged in diplomatic bargaining remain 
free to tear up treaties and walk away at any time, the constantly increasing costs of 
exit in a densely integrated polity have rendered this option virtually impossible’ 
(Pierson 1996). While other theoretical perspective have also highlighted the im-
portance of exit costs to explain why European leaders preferred to reform the EMU 
regime rather than leaving the euro (see below), HI goes further by clarifying how 
barriers to a German exit have intensified as a result of societal actors’ previous insti-
tutional investments in the euro project and the ‘increasing returns’ associated with 
these investments. As Pierson (2000) explained, ‘[i]n an increasing return process the 
probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that 
path. This is because the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other 
possible options increase over time.’ A common manifestation of such a self-
reinforcing increasing returns process occurs ‘when certain political actors consoli-
date power during an early formative period and end up promoting institutions and 
rules that enable them to maintain their authority over time’ (Tsai 2006).  
From a HI perspective, it can be argued that the establishment of the EMU and its 
non-accommodating macroeconomic policy regime – featuring restrictive fiscal rules 
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and an orthodox central bank prohibited from monetary financing of public deficits 
and a sole mandate to maintain price stability – increased the relative benefits for key 
actors in Germany. Germany’s coordinated wage-setting institutions were highly con-
ducive to maintaining the cost competitiveness of its manufacturing firms and provid-
ed them with a key adjustment advantage within EMU’s non-accommodating macro-
economic policy regime. The presence of these wage setting institutions, character-
ized by coordination of wage restraint by trade unions in the exposed export sectors 
and the extension of wage restraint to the sheltered sectors, proved to be a crucial in-
stitutional advantage that differentiated the EA’s creditor countries from the debtor 
countries (Johnston et al. 2013). The euro eliminated the possibility of the debtor 
countries using periodic nominal devaluation as a strategy to regain competitiveness, 
allowing German export-oriented firms to turn an overvalued real exchange rate to 
into a substantially undervalued one. As a result, the ability and determination of 
German export-oriented employer organizations and trade unions to exert wage re-
straint became even more pronounced after the introduction of the euro.
i
 Indeed, as 
Höpner and Lutter (2014: 7) note, ‘[i]f trade partners cannot devaluate, it becomes 
more likely that nominal wage restraint will actually result in the enhancement of 
price competitiveness not only in the short, but also in the medium run. Accession to a 
fixed currency regime should, therefore, gradually alter the relative weight of consid-
erations upon which exposed-sector trade unions base their wage demands.’  
An unintended consequence of the adoption of wage restraint was that the German 
economy became increasingly export-led throughout the EMU era and gradually more 
dependent on a growing intra-EA trade surplus, which was substantially higher than 
its extra-EA trade surplus. The elimination of exchange rate risk also increased Ger-
man banks’ incentive to earn huge carry trade profits by investing these trade surplus-
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es in higher yielding assets issued by debtor countries in the region, leading to a net 
creditor position of Germany vis-à-vis the rest of the EA of more than 20 percent of 
GDP (Bibow 2013). The deepening of these trade and financial linkages therefore 
suggests that German export sectors, financial institutions and taxpayers have much to 
lose from European monetary disintegration: the euro has shielded German manufac-
turing firms from the currency appreciation that would normally have resulted from 
persistent external surpluses, the recycling of which by the German financial system 
exposed banks (and eventually taxpayers) to massive financial losses that would be 
associated with a EA break-up (Kirkegaard 2014). Early attempts to quantify the ef-
fects of EMU break-up assumed a devaluation of 80 percent for Greece, 50 percent 
for Spain, Portugal and Ireland, 25 percent for Italy and 15 percent for France against 
a renewed Deutsche mark (Cliffe et al. 2010), suggesting that the profitability of and 
employment in the German export-oriented sectors would have been fatally under-
mined. Peterson (2013) calculated that by 2025 the accumulated output loss following 
a German exit would amount to €1.2 trillion – an estimation that did not even take 
into account the huge financial losses on German banks’ and taxpayers’ foreign assets 
resulting from a Deutschmark appreciation and/or foreign default on these assets.        
These material costs – which are the flipside of the increasing returns of European 
monetary integration – have made the exit option increasingly unmanageable, pushing 
the German government to make the EMU sustainable rather than allowing European 
monetary disintegration. A key insight of HI is that, because of these sunk costs, the 
preferences of political actors are informed by point-to-point comparisons, whereby 
evaluations of the costs and benefits of adapting to new circumstances are compared 
with the costs and benefits of maintaining or losing their investments in past arrange-
ments. Such point-point comparisons – rather than end-point comparisons that seem 
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to inform preferences and motivate action in rational choice traditions – also point to 
the importance of timing and sequence of events: ‘[T]the calculations of political ac-
tors (for example, their understanding of their stakes in the current setting), and the 
nature of the constraints under which they operate (for example, some options may 
not really exist due to the sequence of prior events) may change significantly over 
time’ (Fioretos 2011: 371; Farrell and Newman 2010; Pierson 1996; Mahoney 2000). 
By drawing attention to how political calculations and preferences evolve over time 
and to a significant extent are endogenous to European monetary integration, HI offer 
tools to explain why the German government responded to the crisis by eventually 
agreeing on new policies, rules and institutions that were rejected during the original 
negotiations on EMU and would never have been accepted at initial stages of the cri-
sis. Indeed, as one interlocutor noted, ‘the initial starting position of the German es-
tablishment is already miles away from where we are now. There is a saying in Berlin 
that Ms Merkel drew so many lines that we now have a zebra cross. These conces-
sions have moved Germany away of key principles that were held dearly.’
ii
  
The observation that gradual adjustments to the EMU regime have significantly di-
gressed from initial German preferences is at odds with liberal governmentalist ac-
counts of the European responses to the crisis. According to Schimmelfennig (2015), 
asymmetrical interdependence resulted in a burden-sharing and institutional design 
that predominantly reflected the preferences of Germany and the other creditor coun-
tries: ‘Whereas the stakes were prohibitively high for all EA countries, the immediate 
consequences of the crisis were significantly more severe for the highly indebted 
countries than for the solvent countries … Because they were less immediately and 
heavily threatened by the crisis and held the key to remedying the situation, the 
[creditor] countries, and Germany in particular, were in principle in a better position 
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to realize their preferences on the terms of integration than the southern countries’ 
(2015: 9). Although Schimmelfennig (2015: 2) rightly argues that ‘a common prefer-
ence for the preservation of the euro was accompanied by divergent preferences re-
garding the distribution of adjustment costs’ (2015:  2), his liberal intergovernmental-
ist analysis that the key institutional reforms of the EMU regime predominantly re-
flected the creditor interests of Germany neglects the fact that deflecting the burden of 
adjustment onto debtor countries came at a significant price for Germany: an increas-
ingly expansionary monetary policy by the ECB that clashed with the preferences of 
the Bundesbank, which ‘represents most strongly the rule-based ordoliberal doctrine 
in the German domestic arena’ (Young 2014: 279).  
Neofunctionalist accounts of the EMU reforms, on the other hand, tend to ignore how 
these reforms reflected a struggle over the distribution of adjustment costs between 
creditor and debtor countries. Niemann and Ioannou (2015: 8) assume that ‘a break-
up of EMU and/or the exit of a member state would have posed very considerable 
costs and risks’, yet their neofunctionalist analysis overstates the amount of consensus 
within transnational business groups regarding the distribution of these adjustment 
costs. Notwithstanding the fact that ‘much of the corporate interest representation and 
articulation has taken place through Brussels-based umbrella organizations and/or in a 
co-ordinated fashion transnationally during the crisis’ (2015: 11), employer organisa-
tions in debtor countries tend to favour the adoption of internal revaluation measures 
in creditor countries to support the exporting capacity of their member corporations – 
which is a key issue that is considered to be too contentious to be included in joint 
press statements and reports issued by these transnationally organized umbrella or-
ganizations.
iii
 Furthermore, their neofunctionalist argument that the ECB’s advocacy 
to adjust and deepen the EMU framework resolved ‘functional dissonances between 
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the different policy domains under EMU that jeopardized the ECB’s independence 
and its ability to shield the euro and deliver price stability’ and that its reluctance to 
buy sovereign debt ‘may have itself induced further integrative steps’ (2015: 17; for 
similar arguments, see Yiangou et al. 2013 and Henning 2015) disregards the possi-
bility that the ECB was forced to adopt increasingly unconventional policies to deal 
with the negative side-effects of earlier policy and reform decisions taken by Germa-
ny and the other creditor countries.     
In order to understand the reasons why the German political establishment was forced 
to accept a less orthodox central bank, we need to shift our HI analysis from its em-
phasis on the self-reinforcing increasing returns of European monetary integration 
towards a focus on ‘non-reinforcing event sequences’ during the management of the 
EA crisis. As Pierson (2000: 77) pointed out, events that occur earlier in a particular 
sequence can have a much greater impact on the final outcome of events than later 
events, ‘not necessarily by inducing further movement in the same direction’ but ‘pre-
cisely because they set the stage for a particular kind of reaction in some other direc-
tion.’ As the next section will argue, these non-reinforcing event sequences – ‘reac-
tive sequences’ in which policies and reforms occur in reaction to ‘negative feedback 
loops’ emerging from earlier decisions to deflect the burden of adjustment onto debtor 
countries – explain how early responses to the crisis by Germany have propelled sub-
sequent developments along a trajectory that has increasingly deviated from Germa-
ny’s initial position with regard to monetary policymaking.   
Germany’s management of the euro crisis: negative feedback and reactive se-
quences 
Negative feedback and the incongruity of German domestic interests 
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HI brings attention to how historically contingent socio-economic institutions of na-
tional varieties of capitalism have shaped the interests of domestic societal groups and 
thus the positions governments are likely to adopt in international settings: 
‘[V]ariation in states’ preferences across issue areas’ ought to be ‘consistent with the 
internal logic of individual market economies’ (Fioretos 2001: 215). In this regard, it 
can be argued that the German government’s creditor preferences actually aggregated 
and reflected four different clusters of domestic societal interests that are supported 
by the main political parties and are also strongly embedded in its export-led coordi-
nated market economy and its associated institutions (Bonatti and Fracasso 2013; 
Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013). The central role played by export-oriented 
manufacturing firms in the German socio-economic model made the government in-
trinsically wary of adopting reflationary policies to ease the burden of adjustment 
onto debtor countries, as these policies weaken the cost competitiveness of these firms 
by reducing the incentives for wage restraint among labour unions (Carlin and 
Soskice 2009). The German government also aimed to preserve the stability of the 
German banking system – particularly the publicly owned state banks (Landesbank-
en) and savings banks (Sparkassen) that play a key role in financing the small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) – by avoiding as much as possible the prospect of default 
by debtor countries and a substantial restructuring of their foreign liabilities. In its 
desire to avoid debt mutualisation, the German government also invoked the ‘interests 
of the German taxpayer’ to guarantee that there would be ‘neither regular nor perma-
nent transfers’, making sure that every debtor state ‘must do its homework’ and that 
‘assistance must always be tied to strict conditionalities’ (Angela Merkel quoted in 
Opperman 2012:  511). Finally, the German government defended the interests of the 
Bundesbank, which prefers the ECB to comply as much as possible to its ordoliberal 
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principles of ‘sound’ money, by repeatedly stressing its disapproval of outright pur-
chases of sovereign bonds by the ECB.  
We demonstrate below that the German government’s pursuit of these creditor inter-
ests during its management of the EA crisis produced unintended ‘negative feedback 
loops’, which refer to the ‘consequences of policy that tend to undermine rather than 
reinforce the political, fiscal, or social sustainability of a particular set of policies’ 
(Weaver 2010: 137). As Mahoney (2000) argued, such negative spillovers might gen-
erate ‘reactive sequences’, whereby ‘early events trigger subsequent developments 
not by reproducing a given pattern, but by setting in motion a chain of tightly linked 
reactions and counterreactions’ (Mahoney 2000: 526). The key problem for the Ger-
man government is that the high issue density of the EMU regime and the deepened 
trade and financial linkages between its member states have heightened the likelihood 
of negative feedback loops between those issue-areas that get to the heart of its credi-
tor interests. While the increasing returns and sunk costs of European monetary inte-
gration have pushed the German to agree on various reforms that have saved the euro 
in the short to medium, making the EMU sustainable in the longer term required a 
combination of policies in the following three issue-areas: (a) a more symmetrical 
distribution of macroeconomic adjustment costs between debtor and creditor coun-
tries, whereby the internal devaluation measures in the former countries would be 
matched by internal revaluation measures in the latter; (b) some scheme of debt mutu-
alisation involving either a one-time default on/restructuring of debtors countries’ 
foreign liabilities or more permanent fiscal transfers between creditor and debtor 
countries; (c) a more accommodating monetary policy by the ECB. We aim to show 
that the German government refused to (a) ease the burden of macroeconomic ad-
justment onto debtor countries by adopting internal revaluation measures and (b) ac-
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cept any significant debt mutualisation only at the cost of generating various negative 
feedback loops that eventually forced the ECB to adopt increasingly unconventional 
measures.  
The asymmetrical distribution of macroeconomic adjustment costs generated two in-
terrelated negative spillovers. First, the escalation of sovereign debt yields of debtor 
countries between 2010 and 2012 can be traced back to the refusal of the German 
government and the other creditor countries to adopt reflationary measures to reduce 
their current account surpluses. The key reason why these yields increased during this 
period is that international financial markets doubted the ability of debtor countries to 
produce the economic growth necessary to repay loans. In a monetary union the adop-
tion of internal devaluation measures is bound to be self-defeating in the absence of 
compensating internal revaluation policies in the creditor countries. If the creditor 
countries do not adopt follow strategies to reduce their external surplus in order to 
assist the debtor countries in their attempt to reduce their external deficit, the EA’s 
aggregate current account balance moves to a surplus and creates upward pressure on 
the exchange rate of the euro in ways that undermine the latter countries’ endeavour 
to pursue export-led growth. Second, the asymmetric distribution of the burden of 
macroeconomic adjustment intensified deflationary pressures. Weak domestic aggre-
gate demand translated into low inflation in the creditor countries, thereby increasing 
the pressure on debtor countries to improve their relative competitiveness vis-à-vis the 
creditor countries by means of outright deflation: ‘when inflation turns 
low everywhere in the EA, each unit of deflation/low inflation endured by indebted 
countries delivers less price adjustment relative to the surplus countries. Or put anoth-
er way, each point of relative price adjustment must be bought at the cost of greater 
debt deflation’ (Moghadam et al. 2014). Deflation further weakens the debt sustaina-
Page 11 of 34 JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
bility of these countries by increasing real interest rates and the real value of their 
liabilities as well as by depressing the economic growth necessary to service these 
liabilities.  
In the rest of this section we analyse the reactive sequences through which these two 
negative spillovers were mitigated, thereby drawing particular attention to the German 
government’s challenges in accommodating the domestic societal interests underlying 
its creditor preferences. For analytical purposes, we divide the management of the EA 
crisis in two periods during which solutions were offered to address these spillovers: 
(1) solutions to redress escalating sovereign bond spreads from 2011 to 2012; (2) so-
lutions to mitigate deflationary pressures between 2013 and 2015. While the increas-
ing returns and sunk costs of European monetary integration induced the German 
government to prioritize making the euro more sustainable over exiting EMU, we 
show that these negative spillovers induced it to accept solutions that collide with 
some of these domestic interests. An additional benefit of HI is that it helps us under-
stand which societal interests will prevail in setting the priorities of the German gov-
ernment with respect to crisis management and EMU reforms: adjustments ‘will be 
less likely to occur … in sectors of activity where the relevant interest groups have 
managed to embed themselves deeply in the relevant domestic regulatory structures, 
than in areas where regulators are relatively independent of the interest groups that 
they regulate’ (Farrell and Newman 2010: 620). The lack of embeddedness of Ger-
man interest groups in the decision-making structures over European monetary policy 
made it more likely that the German government would accept adjustments in the 
ECB’s monetary policy strategy than in the other two issue-areas, in which the other 
societal interests are much more strongly vested and the stakes involve more explicit 
material cost-benefit calculations of well-organized sectoral interests.  
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Addressing escalating sovereign bond yields during 2011-2012 
For the purpose of our argument, it is not necessary to repeat the story of all the 
events that led to EMU reforms adopted to solve the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 and 
2011 – the creation of the EFSF and the ESM to offer financial assistance to EMU 
member states and the ‘six pack’ and ‘two pack’ agreements aiming at reforming eco-
nomic governance and strengthening the framework for preventing excessive macroe-
conomic imbalances and fiscal deficits. Intergovernmentalist accounts rightly point 
out that these reforms predominantly reflected the creditor interests of Germany and 
the other solvent countries. 
From an HI perspective, however, these accounts only offer a ‘snapshot view’ that 
neither takes into account ‘the lags between decisions and long-term [unintended] 
consequences’ nor the possibility of ‘societal adaptations and shifts in policy prefer-
ences that occur in the interim’ (Pierson 1996: 126). These initial reforms locked in 
suboptimal institutional arrangements: they were not only ineffective in containing 
the crisis; they also sew the seeds of a further escalation of sovereign debt spreads 
between Germany and the debtor countries, whose own growth prospects were un-
dermined in the face of asymmetrical adjustment costs. In the absence of debt mutual-
isation and/or a more accommodating monetary policy by the ECB, the debt servicing 
capacity of the debtor countries could only be guaranteed by redressing their competi-
tiveness problem in a manner that would allow decreasing their debt levels based on 
substantial economic growth. However, estimates by OECD economists suggested 
that ‘[f]or Spain and Portugal, the current balance changes required to reduce net ex-
ternal debt to 35% of GDP over 20 years [required] improvements in cost competi-
tiveness against the rest of the EA of about 30%, and by more than double that for 
Greece’ (Guillemette and Turner 2013: 6). Because relying only on this mechanism 
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was neither realistic nor desirable, at least part of the necessary competitiveness ad-
justments had to occur in the creditor countries: ‘For example, a 23% increase in 
Germany’s unit labour costs relative to the rest of the EA [was] needed to restore 
German competitiveness to the level prevailing at the creation of the euro’ (2013: 6).    
Bonatti and Fracasso (2013) correctly argue that reducing the export surplus via such 
a sizeable internal revaluation would ‘hardly be consistent with the distinctive fea-
tures of the German conservative socio-economic model.’ While then French Minister 
of Finance Christine Lagarde openly questioned the sustainability of Germany’s ex-
port-led growth model based on wage restraint for the rest of the EA and called for an 
increase domestic demand already in March 2010, the Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Industry (BDI) was prompt to dismiss her suggestion as ‘obsolete in an age of global-
isation and open markets’, and responded that debtor countries could only ‘improve 
their competitiveness through tough reforms and wage policy founded on productivi-
ty.’
iv
 From a German policymaking perspective, any strategy ‘that deliberately tried to 
reduce the competitiveness of one of the most successful exporters in world markets’ 
by increasing wages ‘would look like a bad joke’ (Issing 2010). Even the Zentral-
verband des Deutschen Handwerks – which is the main representative of the predom-
inantly domestic-oriented small and medium enterprises – rejected the notion of in-
creased public spending as ‘an approach to do less good in order to make them bet-
ter.’
v
 Moreover, the adoption of a debt brake in the German constitution in the sum-
mer of 2009 had introduced legal constraints on fiscal reflation: in 2010 the German 
government had to introduce a sizeable package of public spending cuts for the fol-
lowing years in order to gradually reduce the structural deficit by 2016 to the target 
figure of 0.35% of GDP.   
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Because the initial EMU reforms also had revealed that debt mutualisation was not an 
option for Germany and the other creditor countries, international financial markets 
remained in doubt about the debt servicing capacity of the Italian and Spanish gov-
ernment. The continuing rise in Spanish and Italian sovereign debt yields throughout 
2011 eventually forced the ECB to adopt unconventional measures aimed at preserv-
ing financial stability in the region. The ECB’s principle means of intervention was 
the provision of long-term cheap liquidity to EA banks, which were offered €1,020 
billion loans with a maturity of 36 months at a 1% interest rate via two rounds of un-
conventional long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) in December 2011 and Feb-
ruary 2012. These measures should be seen as a reaction to escalating instability in 
interbank and sovereign bond markets rather than as a compensation for EA govern-
ments for reforming the monetary union or implementing structural reforms to im-
prove their competitiveness – as some authors (Yiangou et al. 2013; Henning 2015) 
have argued. The main purpose of the ECB’s LTROs was to prevent a collapse of 
peripheral banking systems. The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) had to 
replace a dysfunctional interbank market in the EA: because banks from distressed 
countries were no longer able to receive funding from the EA interbank market, ac-
cess to the ESCB’s refinancing operations was essential to prevent increasing capital 
flight from leading to banking calamities in these countries. Reliance upon the ECB’s 
LTROs was highly asymmetric across EMU member states: banks from the southern 
countries accounted for 70 percent of the LTRO, whereas northern banks mainly ac-
counted for the €700 billion parked at the ECB deposit facility (Pisani-Ferry and 
Wolff 2012). As such, ‘in the absence of government action, ECB liquidity provision 
kept insolvent institutions alive’ (Reichlin 2014: 389).  
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These liquidity programs clashed with the orthodox preferences of the Bundesbank, 
which remained convinced that ‘[n]either providing life support to ailing banks nor 
propping up the solvency of sovereigns falls under the remit of monetary policy’ 
(Weidmann 2012). While Thompson (2013:10-12) might be right in arguing that the 
LTROs ‘provided a crucial mechanism by which German banks … could dispose of 
periphery assets’ (2013: 10), the repatriation and reallocation of private funds from 
the periphery to Germany indirectly increased the financial exposure of the Bundes-
bank to the periphery. The ESBC’s liquidity facilities offset capital flight by cross-
border credits to debtor country central banks, which were extended by creditor coun-
try central banks (mainly by the Bundesbank) as part of the ESCB’s Target2 payment 
system – the tool used by the ESCB for the settlement of cross-border transactions in 
the EA and for the calculation of debt obligations between the region’s national cen-
tral banks. Whereas peripheral central banks accrued massive liabilities, the Bundes-
bank’s creditor position within the Eurosystem increased exponentially from 2010 to 
2012, reaching €695 billion in September 2012 (Cechetti et al. 2012). The ESCB’s 
liquidity provision therefore indirectly redistributed existing stocks of claims to the 
periphery from the private sector to the Bundesbank, making the German government 
more exposed to the risk of redenomination. In this way, widening Target2 imbalanc-
es locked Germany into monetary integration by further reducing the attractiveness of 
the exit option: ‘the distribution among former participants [of EMU] of assets and 
liabilities of the Eurosystem ... and the interlinked issue of Target balances would 
generate huge difficulties [after the demise of the euro], which could eventually lead 
to a “reparation” problem as destructive as the one which inflicted Germany in the 
interwar period’ (Papadia 2014: 12).  
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These unanticipated effects therefore cast strong doubt on the claim that the ECB’s 
liquidity programs merely promoted the interests of the German government by pro-
tecting German banks from default. Furthermore, these programs set the stage for the 
next step in European monetary integration: the creation of a banking union consist-
ing of a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) and a single resolution mechanism 
(SRM) for EA banks and financial institutions. A key problem was that the LTROs 
further encouraged these banks to engage in carry trades by borrowing from ESCB at 
very low interest and investing a significant part of the funds in higher yielding sover-
eign debt. Acharya and Steffen (2015) found that southern banks (and Italian and 
Spanish banks, in particular) substantially increased their peripheral sovereign bond 
holdings during the first half of 2012. As a result, the LTROs reinforced the vicious 
bank-sovereign loop by increasing the ‘home bias’ in peripheral banks sovereign debt 
holdings. Since these banks held a significant amount of bonds issued by their gov-
ernment on their balance sheets, escalating sovereign bond yields generated an inher-
ent risk of mutually reinforcing sovereign debt and banking crises. Although the 
LTROs temporarily reduced the yields on Spanish and Italian sovereign debt between 
December 2011 and March 2012, these disruptive dynamics were exposed when these 
yields started rising again after this period. When on June 9
th
 2012 the Eurogroup was 
forced to commit up to €100 billion in EFSF funds to the Spanish government to re-
capitalize its banks, EA countries’ leaders launched on June 28
th
 2012 negotiations on 
a European banking union and opened the door to possible direct bank recapitaliza-
tions through the ESM in order ‘to break the vicious circle between banks and sover-
eigns’ (European Council 2012).  
The launch of these negotiations disclosed several tensions between the interests of 
German banks and taxpayers. The German banking system had a high exposure to 
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debtor countries’ sovereign-bank loops, which was unevenly distributed among dif-
ferent types of financial institutions: whereas its Sparkassen remained domestically 
oriented, the balance sheets of its large commercial banks and some of its Landes-
banken were loaded with debt from southern governments and banks. At the early 
stages of the crisis, the German government therefore had to protect these financial 
institutions from major losses by tactically ensuring financing for banking bailouts in 
peripheral countries (as well as to delay sovereign debt restructurings) until they had 
either taken these assets off their balance sheets or created sufficient capital buffers. 
Between the first quarter of 2008 and the fourth quarter of 2012 German banks re-
duced their cross-border holdings – in terms of counterparty GDP – by 1.8 percent in 
France, 5.2 percent in Italy, 10.3 percent in Spain, 8.2 percent in Portugal, 43.2 per-
cent in Ireland and 10.6 percent in Greece (IMF 2013). But by the end of 2012, after 
six months of intergovernmental negotiations on the banking union, the German 
banking system still had about €1,342 billion EA assets on its balance sheet.
vi
 Yet, in 
order to break the sovereign-bank loop, the banking union needed to have an SRM 
with a credible fiscal backstop that to a significant extent had to be funded collective-
ly by European taxpayers (Pisani-Ferry and Wolff 2012a). Therefore, apart from 
shielding its banks from an escalating sovereign debt crisis, the German government 
also had to protect its taxpayers from the creation of an implicit transfer union. After 
mobilizing against offering direct financial support to Spanish banks through the 
ESM, the German association of taxpayers indeed strongly criticized the notion of an 
SRM based upon a European-level backstop funded by taxpayers for unduly ‘punish-
ing responsible banks and governments’ (Bund der Steuerzahler Deutschland 2012). 
However, the real game changer to address the problem of rising yields on Spanish 
and Italian sovereign bonds was not European leapers’ commitment to the banking 
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union, the features of which would still be subject to a process of intergovernmental 
bargaining; it was Mario Draghi’s speech ‘to do whatever it takes’ to save the euro’ 
on July 26
th
 2012 and his pledge on September 6
th
 2012 to engage in outright mone-
tary transactions (OMT), whereby the ECB would buy an unlimited amount of dis-
tressed-country bonds in the secondary market once a government has formally ap-
plied for a bailout program at the ESM. The OMT pledge was deemed necessary to 
address the risk of redomination, which had fragmented European financial markets 
and obstructed the proper transmission of its monetary policy. While being in clear 
conflict with the doctrines of the Bundesbank – whose president voted against the 
decision with the argument that such sovereign bond purchases would be ‘tantamount 
to financing governments by printing banknotes’ with ‘the additional danger that the 
central bank may ultimately redistribute considerable risks among various countries’ 
taxpayers’ (Jens Weidmann quoted in Steen 2012), – the German government backed 
the OMT decision on the basis of its conditionality. This reflected a cautious move 
towards increased pragmatism with respect to monetary policy making, which con-
firms the HI claim that powerful member state governments, while seeking to rein in 
supranational institutions, also ‘recognize that these crucial collective organizations 
cannot function without significant power and that the authority required will grow as 
the tasks addressed at the European level expand and become more complex’ (Pierson 
1996: 132-133). 
Several authors have argued – from a more or less explicitly neofunctionalist perspec-
tive – that the ECB’s OMT pledge was a quid pro quo for EA leaders’ commitment to 
banking union (Henning 2015; Niemann and Iannou 2015; Veron 2014). It is doubt-
ful, however, that the ECB decided to engage in OMT only because EA leaders 
agreed to start negotiating on the banking union. Rather, its decision reflected its am-
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bition to guarantee ‘what may be termed its foremost objective: the sustainability of 
EMU as such’ (Torres 2013: 297). Indeed, arguments connecting OMT to banking 
union cannot easily explain why the ECB did not wait to see the actual content of the 
intergovernmental banking union agreement, which – as it turned out – fell short of 
expectations (see below). Already in mid-September 2012 the finance ministers of 
Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands issued a joint statement opposing any direct 
bank recapitalization by the new ESM to bridge ‘legacy’ capital gaps – that is, losses 
on investments made by banks before the banking union, – thereby reversing the prior 
agreement by those same countries’ at the June 2012 summit that the ESM would 
directly recapitalize Spanish banks, as well as raising doubts about the creditor coun-
tries’ commitment to the banking union project (Posen and Veron 2014). Our counter-
factual hypothesis that the ECB would have intervened even without the commitment 
to banking union is supported by the fact that it felt forced to move further along an 
increasingly heterodox trajectory despite the disappointment of the intergovernmental 
banking union agreement in December 2013 and the lack of additional commitment to 
integration and/or structural reforms in the EA countries.   
Mitigating deflationary pressures 2013-2015 
While proving critical in stabilizing sovereign bond markets, the ECB’s unconven-
tional measures failed to address the other negative spillover of the asymmetric distri-
bution of adjustment costs: deflation. The main problem was that the focus on gener-
ating internal devaluation in debtor countries via reduction in prices and wages with-
out compensating internal revaluation measures in creditor countries contributed to 
disinflation in the region, putting pressure on the ECB to adopt additional expansion-
ary measures to fulfil its mandate. By December 2013 the annual inflation rate aver-
aged 0.9 percent as inflation had already dropped to 0.6 percent in debtor countries 
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and 1.5 percent in creditor countries (Ubide 2014). Between 2010 and 2013 the south-
ern EA countries had made substantial efforts in realigning their real effective ex-
change rates by means of deflationary declines in unit labour costs vis-à-vis creditor 
countries, resulting in a substantial improvement of their trade balance. However, the 
restoration of Germany’s trade surplus over the same period moved the EA’s aggre-
gate current account towards a surplus of €221.3 euro (2.3 percent of GDP), further 
intensifying deflationary pressures by pushing up the euro’s exchange rate. Such a 
high euro was much more problematic for manufacturing firms in the southern coun-
tries – which tend to make price-sensitive standardized goods with low-to-medium 
added value – than for those in Germany – which tend to be specialized in quality 
differentiated, high value-added goods (Vermeiren 2014). Given that these debtor 
countries already had made substantial efforts in realigning their real effective ex-
change rates by means of declining unit labour costs vis-à-vis creditor countries, a 
nominal depreciation of the euro was urgently needed to promote extra-regional re-
balancing (Darvas 2012; Chen et al. 2013; Benassey-Quéré et al. 2014). 
Deflationary pressures were also bound to intensify as a result of the disappointing 
banking union agreement in December 2013. In response to the explicit demand by 
the German association of savings banks that ‘purely national or regional financial 
institutions’ would ‘remain exclusively under the supervision of national supervisors’ 
(Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband 2012), the German government insisted on 
transferring supervisory powers to the ECB and applying the SRM only to systemati-
cally important credit institutions. Apart from the fact that the ECB would directly 
supervise only the approximately 130 most significant banks in the region, an even 
larger problem of the intergovernmental agreement was that the SRM’s common 
backstop would merely have €55 billion at its disposal (initially structured into na-
Page 21 of 34 JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
tional compartments and to be slowly filled up and mutualised over a period of 10 
years) and would not be applied to legacy assets (European Council 2013).
vii
 The lack 
of debt mutualisation has the unintended effect of constraining the process of macroe-
conomic adjustment between creditor and debtor countries. The fact that the common 
fiscal backstop is insufficient and does not apply to legacy assets reduces the level-
playing-field within the European banking system: banks that are backed by solvent 
governments are considered as safer as those that are not. As a result, ‘German banks 
have a lower cost of funding and – all else being equal – higher profitability. To the 
extent that some of the lower cost is rebated to their clients, even industrial firms in 
Germany enjoy a lower cost of capital, giving them an unfair advantage vis-à-vis their 
European competitors’ (Zingales 2013). Moreover, the lack of a solution for legacy 
assets risked inducing governments and regulators in debtor countries to postpone the 
recapitalisation of their distressed banks, which would have detrimental effects on the 
domestic supply of credit and could push these economies into a prolonged deflation-
ary spiral (Valiante 2014).   
Finally, deflationary pressures in the EA deepened as a result of the specific features 
of the ECB’s previous unconventional monetary measures. The LTROs led to a sig-
nificant expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet to a level that could be compared with 
the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet expansion as a percentage of GDP. However, a 
crucial difference between the ECB’s liquidity programs and the Federal Reserve’s 
QE measures was the insertion of an automatic exit mechanism: ‘With a predeter-
mined maturity for bank-based liquidity injections, [the ECB’s] balance sheet [would] 
adjust automatically for all counterparties when banks return the borrowed liquidity 
and [the ECB] the collateral pledged’ (Gabor 2012: 12). Between March 2011 and 
January 2014 ECB’s balance sheet had shrunk by about 35%, mostly because of the 
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reimbursement of LTRO funds by banks. Moreover, the ECB’s OMT pledge indirect-
ly contributed to these deflationary pressures: while not leading to any purchases of 
sovereign bonds, the OMT decision provided global investors with an insurance de-
vise against EA break-up and almost certainly contributed to the euro’s significant 
nominal appreciation between the third quarter of 2012 and the second quarter of 
2014. The president of the ECB regularly expressed his concern about euro apprecia-
tion, which ‘affect[ed] external demand and reduce[d] the competitiveness gains of 
price and cost adjustment in some EA countries’ (Draghi 2014).   
A notable institutional response to the problem of macroeconomic adjustment and 
decreasing inflation has been the supranational entrepreneurship of the Commission, 
which became increasingly critical towards Germany’s persistently high current ac-
count surplus. In its 2013 Alert Mechanism Report the Commission openly acknowl-
edged that excessive surpluses can have negative implications for debtor countries 
through the common exchange rate: ‘Unless the real effective exchange rate appreci-
ates in the surplus countries due to relatively stronger increases in wage and price 
levels, the nominal exchange rate of the euro will tend to appreciate’ which ‘may have 
competitiveness and deflationary effects on ... countries whose exports are more 
price-sensitive’ (European Commission 2013: 15). It therefore maintained that ‘[a]n 
increase in demand in the EA surplus economies would improve the trade balance of 
the EA peripheral economies’, particularly ‘if such an increase in demand (and reduc-
tion in the trade balance) of the surplus countries took place in parallel with a weaken-
ing of the euro exchange rate’ (2013: 16). Increasingly concerned about the problems 
potentially caused by Germany’s persistently high surplus, the Commission even con-
ducted a first in-depth review in 2014 in which it reiterated that ‘spillovers from high-
er domestic demand in Germany could support overall aggregate demand in the EA’ 
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(European Commission 2014: 95). The Commission´s increased activism reflected a 
move from being an ‘agent representing the interests of the creditor countries’ (De 
Grauwe 2013) towards becoming a more balanced player in its approach of macroe-
conomic imbalances, revealing some unanticipated consequences associated with the 
translation of the intergovernmental agreement on the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure into subsequent institutional procedures.
viii
  
However, since the Commission does not have the legal instruments to impose inter-
nal revaluation measures onto Germany, the ECB remained the only supranational 
institution that could fight deflation. The fall of the EA inflation to 0.5 percent in June 
2014 prompted the ECB to implement a new arsenal of unconventional monetary 
measures. It was the first mayor central bank to adopt a negative deposit rate of -0.1% 
and launched a new ‘targeted’ €400 billion LTRO programme. Apart from further 
lowering its deposit rate towards -0.2%, the ECB announced in September 2014 that it 
would purchase a broad portfolio of asset-backed securities (ABSs) and euro-
denominated covered bonds in order to steer its balance sheet back to the level its had 
at the beginning of 2012. However, taking the limited capacity of the European mar-
ket for high-quality ABSs and covered bonds into consideration, it was clear from the 
beginning that it would be highly difficult to accomplish such a balance sheet expan-
sion only by purchasing these private assets. When in December 2013 Mario Draghi 
defined the ECB’s 2012 balance sheet as an explicit target, even Bundesbank officials 
had to admit that ‘buying sovereign bonds would be the only solution to reaching that 
target.’
ix
 One month later, in January 2015, the ECB announced the launch of its 
widely expected QE program, consisting of combined monthly purchases of public 
and private sector securities amounting to €60 billion – intended to be carried out un-
til end-September 2016. Remarkably, the program would be open-ended and ‘be con-
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ducted until we see a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation which is consistent 
with our aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium 
term’ (Draghi 2015).  
How did domestic interests in Germany respond to these supranational responses to 
the problem of deflation? There continues to be widespread consensus among German 
government officials, employer organisations and monetary policymakers about the 
unacceptability of internal revaluation measures in order to assist the rebalancing ef-
forts of debtor countries and avert deflationary pressures in the region. The Commis-
sion’s calls for more symmetrical adjustment generated a backlash by industrial fed-
erations and drew cross-party criticism for aiming to undermine Germany’s export 
strength.
x
 German policymakers believe that the external surplus ‘is the result of mil-
lions savings and investment positions’ on which economic policy should not – and 
could not – have any impact: ‘competitiveness is an issue for firms and the only role 
for economic policy is to offer a framework in which firms can use their competitive 
advantages’.
xi
 The BDI also criticized the Commission’s in-depth review by stressing 
that ‘the export surplus is not the result of political intervention in the market, but of a 
competitiveness that the German companies work on every day’. Nevertheless, Ger-
many’s stellar labour market performance during the EA induced trade unions to be-
come more assertive in their wage demands, leading key trade unions such as IG 
Metall to increasingly link their wage target ambitions to developments in the rest of 
the EA.
xii
 During the summer of 2014 German trade unions received some unexpected 
assistance from the Bundesbank’s president, who backed the push for inflation-
busting wage settlements by arguing in favour of wage increases of at least 3%. Bun-
desbank economists were also reported to have visited the Confederation of German 
Trade Unions (DGB) in order to encourage their members to base their wage targets 
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on the ECB’s 2% inflation target instead of the actual level of low inflation.
xiii
 These 
unprecedented attempts to interfere in the wage bargaining process suggest that the 
Bundesbank preferred higher wage inflation to the adoption of QE measures by the 
ECB, revealing the potential contradictions between German domestic interests dur-
ing this episode of the EA crisis.    
In line with our HI arguments, the Bundesbank seemed to anticipate the reactive se-
quence through which the ECB would be forced to tackle the deflationary effects of 
the asymmetrical distribution of macroeconomic adjustment costs between debtor and 
creditor countries through the adoption of QE. One Bundesbank official acknowl-
edged that ‘there is a clear interaction between the readjustment process and the 
ECB’s monetary policy’ as ‘the process of regaining competitiveness affects inflation 
in debtor countries and inflation in the Eurozone in a way that has repercussions on 
monetary policy.’
xiv
 The Bundesbank main concerns, which were shared by the Ger-
man Ministry of Finance, were that sovereign debt purchases would reduce the pres-
sure on debtor governments to implement fiscal and structural reforms and increased 
the ESCB’s exposure – and therefore the German taxpayer – to debtor default.
xv
 The-
se concerns gained widespread traction within German society, leading several politi-
cians to submit a motion with the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) to investigate 
the legality of the ECB’s OMT. In February 2014 the FCC reinforced these apprehen-
sions by claiming that the ECB’s OMT is contrary to European law, deferring a defi-
nite ruling on the legality of OMT to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Finally, the 
ECB’s decision to lower the deposit rate below zero also attracted general condemna-
tion from German media for penalising German savers and was criticised by the 
Deutschen Sparkassen- und Giroverbands for reducing the amount of money deposit-
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ed at German savings banks, which fund most of their lending activities through de-
posits, as well as for undercutting their net interest margins.
xvi
  
Hence, the ECB’s monetary policy adjustments again revealed the constraints on the 
capacity of the German government to accommodate the domestic societal interests 
underpinning its creditor preferences. The interim ruling of one of the ECJ’s advo-
cate-general that the ECB’s OMT ‘in principle’ adhere to EU law – on the condition 
that it refrains from any direct involvement in the ESM programme – was widely con-
sidered to have cleared the final legal hurdle to engage in an ambitious QE program. 
While its specific features – whereby 80% of the asset purchases and the ensuing de-
fault risks would remain on the balance sheets of the national central banks – reflected 
a bow to to the pressure of Germany and the other creditor countries to minimalize the 
mutualisation of risk, it also demonstrated the inconsistency between the Germany’s 
veto on debt mutualisation and its preference for an orthodox monetary policy that 
does not engage in sovereign debt purchases. In this regard, Germany has been forced 
to approach European monetary policy with increased pragmatism. German policy-
makers accepted the ECJ’s confirmation of the legality of OMT without further con-
testation, possibly because the OMT pledge had ‘reduced the budgetary risk for Ger-
many’ by helping the ECB ‘to reduce its current role as a financial intermediary be-
tween banks in the fragmented financial system’ (Wolff 2013: 30). Taking into ac-
count the uncertain fiscal capacity of the southern government to recapitalise their 
national central banks in the face of losses, the informal consensus about the necessity 
of such a recapitalisation also reduced the prospects of default at the same time as it 
increased the political incentives to roll-over and hold the sovereign debt on their na-
tional central banks’ balance sheets until maturity.
xvii
 Therefore, the ECB’s latest 
monetary decision again demonstrated that Germany’s desire to minimise debt mutu-
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alisation only came at the price of additional unconventional monetary accommoda-
tion.    
Conclusion 
In this article we made use of the HI literature to show how the issue-density and in-
terdependencies created by the EMU made the German government’s approach of 
deflecting the burden of adjustment onto the debtor countries self-defeating, prevent-
ing it from reforming EMU in ways that simultaneously advanced all the domestic 
societal interests underpinning its creditor preferences. The unwillingness of Germany 
and the other creditor countries to adopt reflationary policies to ease the burden of 
adjustment onto the debtor countries made growth in the Eurozone increasingly de-
pendent on the attainment of an extra-regional trade surplus, which weakened the 
competiveness of debtor countries by putting upward pressure on the exchange rate of 
the euro. It also encouraged deflationary pressures, which further weakened their debt 
servicing capacity. While these negative feedback loops put pressure on creditor 
states to accept some mutualisation of debt in a banking union, the German govern-
ment could only minimize the exposure of the German taxpayer by allowing the ECB 
to adopt increasingly unconventional expansionary measures to stabilise sovereign 
bond markets and reduce deflationary pressures. Accordingly, our HI analysis of 
Germany’s influence over the policy process highlights the importance of the tempo-
rality by showing how the sequence of political and economic events during the crisis 
had a path-dependent causal effect for later developments. More specifically, we 
showed that key mechanisms for sequencing in European monetary integration after 
the crisis are negative feedback and reactive sequences rather than positive feedback 
and self-reinforcement (cf. Howlett 2009).   
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A less orthodox ECB has been the price that the German government has so far been 
willing to pay for making the EMU more sustainable and advancing the interests of its 
export-oriented manufacturing sectors, major banks and taxpayers – an adjustment 
that was the most likely to occur in light of the fact that these domestic societal 
groups are not strongly embedded in and have less influence over European monetary 
policy processes than in the other issue-areas. The question remains, however, wheth-
er ECB accommodation will be sufficient for the long-term survival of the euro. Alt-
hough the euro’s depreciation might lead to increased tensions with the EA’s trading 
partners if its aggregate current account surplus keeps on rising, the ECB’s policies 
could also lead to a more symmetrical distribution of adjustment costs by encouraging 
higher inflation in creditor countries (although, in that case, other domestic societal 
interests – particularly the export-oriented German industry – can be expected to mo-
bilize increasingly against the ECB). But in the long-term the institutional incompati-
bility between the EMU regime and the labour market institutions in debtor countries 
would remain, making it possible that regional imbalances will resurface after the 
crisis. The asymmetrical vulnerabilities associated with these imbalances would be 
mitigated by the presence of a more accommodating ce tral bank by making it less 
likely that debtor countries can be pushed into a ‘bad equilibrium’, yet it is uncertain 
that the euro will be sustainable in the longer-term without a more structural mutuali-
sation of debt – for instance via a banking union with a more adequate common back-
stop that will also apply to legacy assets. We believe, nevertheless, that the sunk costs 
of European monetary integration are too high for Germany to a priori exclude the 
possibility of domestic political support for such a more potent backstop.   
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Endnotes 
                                                        
i Interview with representative of German employer organisation, January 2015.  
ii
 Interview with German ECB official, December 2014 in Frankfurt.  
iii
 Interview with representatives of Spanish employer organisation (member of BUSINESSEUROPE) 
and Spanish ministry of finance, October 2014 in Madrid.  
iv Financial Times, March 15 2010.  
v
 Interview with representatives of ZDH, January 2015 in Berlin.  
vi
 Data from the Bundesbank.  
vii
 In March 2014 the European Parliament marginally adjusted the December 2013 deal by reducing 
the build-up period to 8 years and accelerating the mutualisation process. The resolution of banks will 
still be decided by a plethora of institutions, with the European Council retaining a veto power over 
decisions on debt mutualisation.  
viii
 The €315 billion investment plan by the new Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker also aimed 
to stem deflation and promote growth in the region. 
ix
 Interview with Budnesbank official and economists, December 2014 in Frankfurt.  
x
 Financial Times, November 3 2013.  
xi
 Quotes from interviews with German ECB official and Bundesbank official, December 2014 in 
Frankfurt. These views were confirmed in interviews with representatives of the German Federal Min-
istry of Finance and Federal Ministry of the Economy and Energy, January 2015 in Berlin.   
xii
 Interviews with representatives of German trade unions, December 2014 in Frankfurt and January 
2015 in Berlin.  
xiii Interview with representative of German employer organisation, January 2015 in Berlin.  
xiv
 Interview with Bundesbank official and economists, December 2014 in Frankfurt.  
xv
 Interviews with Bundesbank officials and representative of the Federal Ministry of Finance, Decem-
ber 2014 in Frankfurt and January 2015 in Berlin. It is interesting to note that within the Federal Minis-
try of the Economy and Energy there is more pragmatism about these issues and scepticism about the 
allegedly negative effects of QE on debtor countries’ incentives to adopt structural reforms (interview 
with representative of the Federal Ministry of the Economy and Energy, January 2015 in Berlin).  
xvi
 Financial Times, June 4 2014.  
xvii Even though the ECB argued in its 2010 convergence report that ‘any situation should be avoided 
whereby for a prolonged period of time [a national central bank’s] net equity is below the level of its 
statutory capital or is even negative’, it should be noted that there are no legal recapitalization 
resquirements. While there is currently an informal consensus of the necessity of such a recapitalisa-
tion, the German government will most likely approach the issue in a pragmatic way (interview with 
representative of the Federal Ministry of the Economy and Energy, January 2015 in Berlin).  
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